今年年底，世界上兩個最強大的政治力量將分別選出它們的領導人。美國的選舉方式看起來混亂而且低效。與之相反，中國官僚式的方法是專為交接的平穩性和政策的連續性而設計的。共產黨的領導權將由習近平從胡錦濤的手中繼承，這是早已明示了的，但仍有許多職位需要被填上人選。在那扇緊閉的大門之後，公道地說，中國政治的險惡絲毫不亞於凱撒統治下的羅馬。
3月15日薄熙來被免去重慶市委書記職位，使人罕見地得以往那扇大門里偷瞄了一眼。作為黨長征一代中的領導人之一的薄一波的兒子，薄熙來似乎命中註定要屬於中國的權力巔峰——中共九人政治局常委會，他的垮臺代表著二十年來中國領導人們最大的公然分裂。此事有許多值得慶賀的理由，但關鍵的是薄熙來去職的方式明白地昭示著中國政治體系的病灶。
為此事歡呼的第一個理由，在於薄熙來的思想和他治理重慶的方式是如此之令人不安。兩項政策讓他聲名鵲起，第一項是對重慶黑勢力的大面積打壓。許多黑社會分子都與腐敗官員有著千絲萬縷的聯繫，然而薄熙來對此毫無顧忌，這在許多的普通中國人中深得人心。但有可靠消息指出，薄熙來利用這場運動為自己的政治目的服務，他有選擇性地打擊他的反對者們。一位現藏于海外的重慶商人，稱他曾遭到薄熙來黨羽的酷刑和勒索。
另外一項政策某程度上是在向毛澤東主義致敬——對國家榮譽感的推崇，比如復興“紅歌”，其中包括不少文化大革命時期的流行歌曲。這次運動展示出令人震驚的偽善和健忘，薄熙來自身也曾遭受過文化大革命時期的苦難。但薄熙來很快就重獲太子党的在仕途上的特權，這些“左派”把他的孩子送到了西方貴族學校讀書。無論是“唱紅”還是“打黑”，都可以被視為權力鬥爭的一部份，直指薄熙來的前任兼常委席位的競敵汪洋的權力鬥爭。現任廣東省委書記汪洋，有著類似自由主義者的名望，如此看來他在這場博弈中的貌似勝出是件好事。
同樣可喜的是，此次事件為腐敗不堪、自相殘殺的黨內政治開啟了一扇小窗。促使薄熙來的垮臺的是王立軍逃入美國大使館的事件，王立軍是薄熙來的前任警察局長，也是他在打黑運動中的左右手。王立軍現正在接受中國方面的調查，薄熙來或許很快也會發現自己回答著令人尷尬的問題。對於薄熙來來說，把重慶的家醜吹進了美國大使的耳朵里或許比這醜本身更讓他難堪。但薄熙來的免職并不意味著黨和政府的官員要為他們自己的行為負責的新時代的來臨。犯罪和過失，就像意識形態一樣，不過是權力鬥爭中的武器而已，獲勝者大可以把它們都扔在一邊。
在免職令下達的前一天，中國的總理溫家寶罕見地在記者會上公開針砭了重慶的領導人，這已然預示了罷免的到來。然而，溫家寶所說的另一句被推測為對薄的指責的話更為令人驚訝，他說，缺失了政治改革“文化大革命那樣的”悲劇或將再度發生。這聽起來很荒謬：高速成長、愈發多元的中國并未瀕於那種對黨歇斯底裡的狂熱的爆發，而那種狂熱在60年代末曾感染了整個中國。
然而溫家寶是對的，他指出了這個國家的政治體制在本質上仍然一成未變。它仍是那個在北京的幾個人間的派系爭執就會震動整個國土的國家；它仍是那個近在1989年一場持續的抗爭化作北京街頭的一抹血污的國家；它仍是那個共產黨只執行過一次平穩接班的國家，那是最近的一次換屆，在2002年。相形之下，美國那些折騰的程序看起來是那麼的吸引人。
（個人翻譯練習）
Chinese politics
The sacking of Bo Xilai
A princeling’s downfall reveals the rottenness at the heart of Chinese politics
Mar 17th 2012 | from the print edition
LATE this year, the world’s two biggest powers will each choose their leaders. The way America does it looks messy and inefficient. China’s bureaucratic method, by contrast, is designed to provide a smooth transition and a continuity of policy. It has long been signalled that this year Xi Jinping will inherit the Communist Party’s leadership from Hu Jintao. But there are many other posts to be filled. Behind closed doors, it is fair to assume that politics in China are no less vicious than in the Rome of Julius Caesar.
The sacking on March 15th of Bo Xilai as party chief of the south-western region of Chongqing provided a rare glimpse inside those doors. The son of Bo Yibo, a leader of the Party’s Long March generation, Mr Bo had seemed destined for the zenith of power in China—the nine-member standing committee of the party’s Politburo. His downfall represents the biggest public rift in China’s leadership for two decades. There are reasons to celebrate it; yet the manner of his going is a sharp reminder of what’s wrong with China’s political system.
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The first reason to cheer is that some of Mr Bo’s ideas, and the style of his rule in Chongqing, were disturbing. Two policies made him famous. The first was a popular crackdown on Chongqing’s “mafia”. Many ordinary Chinese welcomed his no-holds-barred approach to going after gangsters, many of whom would have had links with corrupt officials. But there are credible allegations that Mr Bo used his campaign for his own political ends, selectively attacking his opponents. A local businessman, now in hiding abroad, has said he suffered torture and extortion at the hands of Mr Bo’s henchmen.
The other policy was to pay homage to some aspects of Maoism—favouring state enterprises, for example, and reviving “red songs”, including some popular during the Cultural Revolution. The campaign showed breathtaking hypocrisy as well as forgiveness. Mr Bo himself suffered during the Cultural Revolution. But thereafter he resumed the privileged career path of the princeling. This “leftist” sends his children to elite schools in the West. Both “red” and “anti-mafia” campaigns can be seen as part of a power struggle, designed to discredit Wang Yang, his predecessor in Chongqing, and rival for a standing-committee seat. Mr Wang, now party secretary in the southern province of Guangdong, has a reputation as something of a liberal. That he seems to have come out on top in this battle is good news.
Welcome, too, is the little window the affair opens into the corrupt, fratricidal ways of party politics. Mr Bo’s downfall was precipitated by the flight to an American consulate of Wang Lijun, his former police chief and right hand in the anti-mafia drive. Mr Wang is now under investigation in China. Mr Bo, too, may soon find himself answering awkward questions. That Chongqing’s dirty linen was aired in front of American diplomats on his watch may matter more than the dirt itself. But his sacking will not herald a new era in which party and government officials are to account for their actions. Crimes and misdemeanours, like ideology, are merely weapons in a power struggle. Winners can still get away with it.
The day before the sacking, Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister, had foreshadowed it with a rare public ticking-off for the Chongqing leadership at a press conference. In another presumed dig at Mr Bo, however, Mr Wen said something rather remarkable: that, without political reform China might suffer another tragedy, “like the Cultural Revolution”. This seems preposterous: fast-growing, increasingly plural China is not on the brink of a similar outbreak of party- fanned mass hysteria like the one that gripped China in the late 1960s.
The party is not over
Mr Wen is right, however, to point out that the political system remains basically unaltered. It is still one in which the factional squabbles of a few men in Beijing are fought out across the whole nation. It is still one in which, as recently as 1989, a succession struggle was waged in blood on the streets of Beijing. It is still one in which the Communist Party has only managed one smooth transfer of leadership, its most recent transition in 2002. By comparison, America’s laborious process looks rather attractive.
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